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Is there a right or wrong way to play a game? Many think not. Some have argued 
that, when we insist that players obey the rules of a game, we give too much weight to 
the author’s intent. Others have argued that such obedience to the rules violates the 
true purpose of games, which is fostering free and creative play. Both of these responses, 
I argue, misunderstand the nature of games and their rules. The rules do not tell us 
how to interpret a game; they merely tell us what the game is. And the point of the 
rules is not always to foster free and creative play. The point can be, instead, to com-
municate a sculpted form of activity. And in games, as with any form of communica-
tion, we need some shared norms to ground communicative stability. Games have what 
has been called a “prescriptive ontology.” A game is something more than simply a 
piece of material. It is some material as approached in a certain specified way. These 
prescriptions help to fix a common object of attention. Games share this prescriptive 
ontology with more traditional kinds of works. Novels are more than just a set of words 
on a page; they are those words read in a certain order. Games are more than just some 
software or cardboard bits; they are those bits interacted with according to certain 
rules. Part of a game’s essential nature is the prescriptions for how we are to play it. 
What’s more, we investigate the prescriptive ontology of games, we will uncover at least 
distinct prescriptive categories of games. Party games prescribe that we encounter the 
game once; heavy strategy games prescribe we encounter the game many times; and 
community evolution games prescribe that we encounter the game while embedded in 
an ongoing community of play. 
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1. Introduction 
Is there a right or wrong way to play a game? You might think that, if you 
wanted to play a game, you had to follow the rules. You might even think that 
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you should try to play each game in the right spirit: for example, trying hard to 
win, in the case of Defense of the Ancients 2 (Icefrog 2013); or drunk, in the case of 
beer pong. 1 But many have resisted the claim that there are, or should be, any 
sorts of prescriptions on how a game should be played. For some, the demand 
for obedience to the rules of a game is an attitude stinking of authoritarianism, 
dogmatism, and subservience. According to such a view, a truly mature and self-
actualized game-player will have transcended the sense that there is some right 
way to play a game. In other words, true game-play is free game-play. Such an 
antipathy to rules, I suspect, lies underneath the advocacy for free-form creative 
play over rule-bound games, and underneath the advocacy for creative toys and 
sandbox games over more structured, goal-oriented forms of play. But I do not 
think that this is always the right way to think about the prescriptions in play. 
Obedience to the rules and other implicit norms, I will argue, is what stabilizes 
games as objects of shared attention. Shared prescriptions are what enable 
shared experience, and so undergird communicative stability. Free play is one 
thing, but structured games are another, and games have something special to 
offer us in return for our temporary obedience to the rules and norms of play. 
Structured games let us design, record, and transmit forms of activity between 
people.  
Let’s consider two recent arguments that there is no right way to play a game. 
First, Olli Tapio Leino has argued that, for game scholars, an insistence on fol-
lowing the rules is simply a form of the intentional fallacy. Critical theory has 
typically held that an author’s intentions ought to have no authority over how 
their work is received. A reader should be free to read and interpret a text as they 
please. Insisting that players play according to the rules, says Leino, is simply 
another instance of the intentional fallacy. Second, Miguel Sicart has argued that 
excessive obedience to game rules subverts the true purpose of games. Games, 
says Sicart, are for play, and play is essentially free and appropriative. Dogmat-
ically following the rules and pursuing the appointed in-game goals is, in the end, 
a failure to see the real purpose of games, which is to cultivate free play.  
I have several goals in this paper. First, I will attempt to defuse these worries 
and defend the importance of prescriptions for structured play, drawing on re-
cent work in aesthetic ontology. Games, I will claim, have a very distinctive on-
tology. They are more than simply a set of physical materials. Games are a set of 
materials as approached in some particular, prescribed, way. Those prescriptions 
help to fix a shared and common object of attention. You have to play by the 
                                                        1	Grant	Tavinor	has	argued	for	the	existence	of	two	prescriptions	for	playing	videogames	properly.	A	player	is	prescribed	to	play	the	game	while	trying	to	win,	and	to	interpret	the	narrative	events	of	the	game	as	they	play	(Tavinor	2017,	32-4).	Notice	that	these	prescriptions	are	not	merely	from	our	social	obligations	to	other	players	–-	such	as,	for	example,	our	obligation	to	give	our	friends	a	good	game	since	they	drove	all	this	way.	Such	social	obliga-tions	are	a	distinct	topic,	and	have	been	explored	elsewhere	(Weimer	2012,	Nguyen	2017).	Rather,	Tavinor	is	de-scribing	a	set	of	prescriptions	that	directly	concern	our	behavior	towards	the	game	itself.	His	account	is	more	in	the	spirit	of	the	idea	that	a	viewer	might	have,	say,	obligations	to	the	artworks	themselves	(Moran	2012).		
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rules to even encounter the game. Second, I will show that those prescriptions 
serve a very particular purpose: they undergird the possibility of stable commu-
nication. Shared prescriptions enable shared experiences. Following these pre-
scriptions is no more harmful to our autonomy than, say, following the simple 
prescriptions of language, in order to communicate. Finally, I will argue that 
games have their own special sorts of prescriptions, quite distinctive from the 
prescriptions which surround traditional artworks. And these prescriptions go 
beyond the simple demand that we play by the rules and try to win. Some games 
may demand that we become moderately skilled. Other games may require that 
we play them while embedded inside a strategic community, responding to the 
newly emergent strategies and styles. Games, like more traditional artworks, are 
partially constituted by prescriptions; but games have their own very special 
body of prescriptions, which arise from their interactive, emergent, and player-
driven nature.  
 
 
2. Works and Norms 
Let us turn first to Leino’s worry. Leino argues that game scholars have usu-
ally presumed what he calls the ludic imperative: that in order to study a game, one 
has to play it in the spirit that was intended by the designer -- adopting the goals 
of the game and trying to win by its rules. But, says Leino, this normativity is 
problematic; it is a form of the intentional fallacy. It permits the author too much 
power over the audience’s experience.  
Let’s take a moment to dig into the details of the intentional fallacy. As it was 
originally introduced by W.K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe Beardsley, the argu-
ment concerning the intentional fallacy was quite narrow in scope. Wimsatt and 
Beardsley argued that the intentions of the artist ought not be used by an art 
critic in judging the success of the work  (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946). Since 
then, a broader version of this thesis has become widely accepted. The intentional 
fallacy is now usually taken to show that we ought not take an author’s intent to 
determine the proper interpretation or meaning of the work, or to set the audi-
ence’s proper reaction to the work. For example: suppose Darren Aronofsky in-
tended Requiem for a Dream to be a sorrowful portrait of addiction. But, says the 
standard doctrine, there is no mysterious norm that forces me, the viewer, to 
interpret it in accordance with Aronofsky’s intent. I am free to react as I please -
- free to find it nauseatingly pretentious and emotionally ham-fisted, or to inter-
pret it as a portrait of the death throes of late capitalism. The author cannot pre-
scribe the reader’s interpretation or reaction. But, says Leino, the ludic impera-
tive posits prescriptions about how a player should play and derives them from 
authorial intent. So the ludic imperative is simply a version of the intentional 
fallacy, and we should ignore it. Players of games are free to interact with a game 
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as they please, just as readers are free to interpret a text in any way they wish 
(Leino 2012).  
Suppose, for the moment, that we accepted that the intentional fallacy was, 
indeed, a fallacy. Even then, I do not think we should be so quick to discard the 
ludic imperative, because I do not think that the ludic imperative actually com-
mits us to intentional fallacy. To see this, let’s turn to some recent work from 
analytic aesthetics, concerning what has come to be called the theory of “pre-
scriptive ontology.” Theories of prescriptive ontology focus on the category of 
human artifacts called “works” -- including novels, paintings, movies, and musi-
cal pieces and performances. According to a prescriptive ontology, works are 
partially constituted by prescriptions about how they are to be encountered. For 
example: the practice of European painting prescribes that users look at the can-
vas, rather than eating it, and that they look at the front, and not the back (Davies 
2004, 50-79). The work which is Van Gogh’s Irises is more than just the canvas 
and the paint. If I run my hands over the rough feel of the canvas and lick the 
paint while keeping my eyes closed, I have encountered the canvas, but I have 
not encountered Van Gogh’s Irises. Similarly, the work which is The Brothers 
Karamazov is more than just simply a physical book. It is the book, plus the pre-
scription to read the words sequentially from front to back. If I read all the words 
at random, I have interacted with the physical object, but I have not actually read 
The Brothers Karamazov. Similarly, if I were to tear the pages out of The Brothers 
Karamazov and eat them with gusto, I would have interacted with the physical 
object, but not actually encountered the thing that is the novel. This is all just to 
say that a work is not identical with its material substrate. Works are rather more 
ontologically complicated than that. In order to experience the work, one must 
encounter the material substrate in a certain way (Currie 1989). The prescrip-
tions on encounter reveal what the work is: The Brothers Karamazov is not this 
physical set of pages, but the more abstract entity which I can only access when 
I read these physical in a certain way: by reading all the words in order.  
Prescriptive ontologies help us to get clearer about the differences between 
different kinds of art. For example, traditional museum paintings have a simple 
prescriptive ontology, where we are prescribed to look at them from the front 
and attend to the visual aspects of what’s inside the physical frame. Dominic 
Lopes suggests that interactive computer art, as one might find in a museum, has 
a different prescriptive ontology from painting. With interactive art, the audience 
is prescribed to interact with the artwork, to observe its changing displays, and 
to use that interaction to appreciate the possibility space of the game. The audi-
ence is supposed to use their actions to bring the algorithm of the interactive art-
work into view. If they simply observe, briefly, the various interfaces and screens 
from afar, without actually interacting with them and exploring the possibility 
space, then they haven’t encountered the work (Lopes 2010, 27-36,60). 
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Elsewhere, I’ve argued that certain kinds of games –- which I call “aesthetic striv-
ing games” -- have a different prescriptive ontology than Lopes’ interactive com-
puter art. In aesthetic striving games, players are prescribed to play the game, 
and then to appreciate their own activity, rather than appreciating the external al-
gorithm (Nguyen forthcoming, Chapter 5 and 6). In this way, aesthetic striving 
games are less like paintings and interactive computer art, and more like certain 
contemporary art practices of social art. Consider, for example, Nicolas Bour-
riaud’s discussion of relational aesthetics. Bourriaud focuses on those social art-
works which try to create micro-utopias in the here and now. A prime example 
is Rirkrit Tiravanija’s social artworks, which consisted of a makeshift kitchen 
installed in a museum space, where the artist prepared curries for the audience. 
For Tiravanija, the focus of the work was not the food, but the audience’s in-
volvement with the food, the place, and each other (Bourriaud 1998, Bishop 
2004, 55-56). There, the audience is prescribed to attend to their own socializing 
and to how the food and the place brings about that socialization, rather than just 
to the food or just to the visual features of the kitchen installation. Social art-
works and aesthetic striving games involve prescriptions for the audience to at-
tend to their own activity, where paintings and interactive art involve prescrip-
tions for the audience to attend to some external object.  
Notice that the same bit of physical material can be a part of some very dif-
ferent works, simply by being attached to different prescriptions. We can vary 
the work by simply varying the prescriptions. Suppose that our artwork materi-
ally consisted of an old arcade cabinet for the game Space Invaders (Nishikado 
1978), to which we had added some Marxist graffiti, in the middle of a warehouse 
space. We could display that cabinet as a sculpture, in which case the audience 
would be prescribed to walk around it and appreciate its visual and spatial prop-
erties. Or we could offer that cabinet for use as an aesthetic striving game, in 
which case the audience would be prescribed to play the game and appreciate 
their own activity of play. Or we could create a Tiravanija-style social artwork 
around such a cabinet, where the audience was prescribed to hang out and inter-
mingle with one another, taking turns playing the game, while kibitzing and chat-
ting -– where the audience was prescribed to primarily appreciate the emergent 
social interaction inspired by the arcade game.  
Perhaps it seems strange to think that the same physical material might take 
part in so many different possible artworks. And it might seem even stranger that 
we could change the artworks just by varying the prescriptions for the audience. 
But this is an utterly mundane and familiar phenomenon. We could take the same 
bit of alcohol in a vial, and display it as a sculpture (prescription: look at it from 
all around), or offer it as a perfume (prescription: apply and smell, but don’t 
taste), or offer it as a cocktail (prescription: drink and taste). The theory of pre-
scriptive ontologies simply articulates, in a rigorous manner, something essential 
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about the nature of works -– something so basic that it is easy to overlook. A 
work is something above and beyond merely a bit of material. It is that material, 
accessed in a certain way -– under a prescribed set of activities, with our attention 
focused on particular aspects. It is a particular specified angle of approach to a 
bit of material.  
Yuriko Saito puts it in a usefully elegant way. Works, she says, are framed. 
The frame tells us what to pay attention to, by telling us what is part of the work 
and what isn’t. Sometimes, that attentional frame is partly physical. The physical 
frame around a painting tells us to look at what’s inside, and not what’s outside. 
But even with painting, the physical frame is not the end of story. Much of the 
attentional frame is specified through immaterial prescriptions. We know that we 
are supposed to look at, and not lick or touch, what is inside the frame (Saito 
2010, 18-23). Prescriptions help to fix a common object of attention, which can 
be shared between artist and audience and between different audience members.  
How do we know the right prescriptions? Sherri Irvin suggests that, for fa-
miliar and well-established forms of art, the prescriptions are transmitted as so-
cial practices. There is a social practice of novels, and another for classical music 
performances, and another for electronic dance music performances, and we as-
similate those prescriptions as part of our enculturation. Each practice involves 
a stable set of prescriptions, and an artist declares the relevant prescriptions by 
placing their work in a particular context. I declare one set of prescriptions when 
I sell my book in a bookstore, and another when I place my book behind glass in 
a museum. But, says Irvin, when an artist wishes to place a different set of pre-
scriptions on their work, they can simply declare those new prescriptions explic-
itly. Such explicit declarations are how many contemporary art practitioners, like 
Tiravanija, communicate novel sets of prescriptions to their audiences (Irvin 
2005).2 
The point here is not to issue global and authoritative commands to people 
about how to live their lives. Rather, it is to articulate something about the nature 
of works by analyzing our practices of encountering and talking about them. On-
tological prescriptions aren’t categorical -- there is no claim that everybody must 
look at the front of the canvas. The prescriptions are only hypothetical. I ought 
to look at the front of the canvas if I wish to view Irises. If I do not wish to view 
that work, than those prescriptions don’t apply. Similarly, there is nothing wrong 
with my swatting mosquitos with my copy of The Brothers Karamazov. But in doing 
so, I have not read The Brothers Karamazov, and there would be something wrong 
with my, say, reviewing the novel -– on Amazon, say -– based solely on my 
                                                        
2Some	may	protest	that	one	cannot	read	these	prescriptions	off	the	mere	material	itself;	thus,	it	would	be	pos-sible	to	dig	up	an	artifact.	Shorn	of	its	context,	it	might	be	hard	to	impossible	to	ascertain	what	the	prescriptions	would	have	been.	But	this	doesn’t	show	us	that	the	theory	of	prescriptive	ontology	is	wrong;	it	just	shows	us	that	works,	as	socially	embedded	practices,	are	more	fragile	than	actual	stone	and	cloth.	
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experiences of using the physical object as a weapon or a doorstop. (“The Brothers 
Karamovoz is too heavy to swat mosquitos comfortably. 1 star.”) The work is on-
tologically distinct from the physical object.  
Crucially, as Irvin points out, holding a prescriptive ontology is entirely com-
patible with still believing that the intentional fallacy is, in fact, a fallacy. Theories 
of prescriptive ontology don’t say that the author gets to set how the work is to 
be interpreted, received, judged, or to set its meaning. They only say that the 
author gets to set what counts as a minimally adequate encounter with the work. That is, 
according to a prescriptive ontology, the author gets to set with the work is, but 
not what it means. Thus, the commitments of a prescriptive ontology are entirely 
compatible with holding the author cannot set the correct interpretation of a 
work, and that the audience may respond in any way they wish. These ontologi-
cal prescriptions are silent on what the proper aesthetic judgment is, or the 
proper interpretation it. They only indicate what the work is, by setting the terms 
of proper encounter. They set the boundaries of the object which is to be inter-
preted. And to see that there are such conditions, simply consider the following 
claim: “Transformers 3 is a far better movie than Django Unchained; I tasted both 
DVDs, and the paint on Transformers 3 is much yummier.”  
At this point, you might protest that this all makes artworks out to be contin-
gent, culturally relative affairs. It makes games out to be artifacts that are inex-
tricably social in their ontology. But that is exactly the insight on offer. A novel 
is more than just this physical book, and a game is more than just this software 
and hardware, or these cardboard bits. Works are social artifacts. They are not 
simply material artifacts, but artifacts consisting of some material embedded 
within some normative framework. And we can see this by seeing that there are 
non-material prescriptions for what counts as minimally encountering a work.  
Importantly, Wimsatt and Beardsley took, as one of their primary reason for 
thinking that we ought to disregard the author’s intent, the fact that such inten-
tions was private and essentially inaccessible. But, according to Irvin, ontological 
prescriptions aren’t set by private mental acts, but by publicly available artistic 
sanctions. The artist engages in a set of public acts which declare the relevant 
prescriptions. They can present that work in a particular social context, associ-
ating it with a publicly available set of prescriptions, or simply declare some new 
prescriptions explicitly, as when a contemporary artist tells us exactly how we 
are to interact with a new kind of work. A work’s prescriptive ontology can easily 
be made public, because it is far less complex thing than, say, a work’s meaning. 
A prescriptive ontology is a simple set of rules for interaction: “Read all the words 
in order, from front to back, and imagine the character and the world described.” 
“Follow the rules and try to win.”  
Games, like paintings and novels, have prescriptive ontologies. This is evi-
dent when we consider how attempted encounters with the work might fail to 
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meet the relevant prescriptions. Imagine, for example, a reviewer of Super Mario 
World (Miyamoto 1990) giving the game a bad review because the cartridge 
smelled funny, or giving a good review of the game based only on the box art. Or 
imagine that they judged the work boring, having only started up the game and 
stared at the opening menu for fifty hours. These would be failures of criticism, 
and failures of the same sort as one might commit by reviewing Paul Beatty’s 
new novel, The Sellout, based only on having eaten the pages. They are failures to 
actually encounter the work. Only a prescriptive ontology can explain basic fea-
tures of the social practices which surround games. Thus, the ludic imperative -- 
that game scholars play a game as it was intended to be played – does not commit 
the intentional fallacy. Nothing in the ludic imperative permits the author to fix 
the appropriate meaning or reaction to the work; it only permits the author to fix 
what the work is, and so fix the conditions under which we can encounter the 
work.  
Recall Leino’s original argument: that there shouldn’t be prescriptions on 
how a player interacts with a game, just as there shouldn’t be prescriptions on a 
how a reader interprets a text. The discussion of prescriptive ontology now re-
veals the problem in this argument: it assimilates interacting with a game to inter-
preting a text. But, in fact, an author can set the prescriptions on how a reader 
interacts with a text: by saying that it is a novel, the author specifies that it must 
be read in a particular order. And the existence of that requirement is compatible 
with the view that the author has no power over how a reader interprets the 
work, which they have encountered by following the interaction rules of novels. 
Similarly, there are prescriptions on how a player should interact with a game, 
even if there are no prescriptions on how a player should interpret the results of 
that interaction. The ludic imperative determines only ontology, not interpreta-
tion.  
 Which is not to say that there is not very much to be learned by abandoning 
the ludic imperative in some circumstances. Art historians can learn of much of 
worth from studying the back of canvas, and game scholars can learn very much 
from studying the code. In fact, historians of, say, chemistry may perfectly well 
ignore the artwork and just focus on the composition of the canvas. Similarly, 
historians of coding may perfectly well ignore the game’s rules, and focus on the 
software. But if we are to do art history, the animating force of our interest is in 
the artworks. And if we are to be game scholars, the animating force of our in-
terest is in the game.  
We can now see what is compelling about Leino’s claim and what we might 
wish to resist. There are two distinct objects of study: the materiality of a game, 
and the game itself. Game scholars should certainly study the materiality of a 
game, in which case they should not be bound by the ludic imperative at all. But 
they shouldn’t think that, by doing so, they have actually encountered the game 
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when they ignore the rules. A biologist might learn all sorts of useful things by 
studying the cells from my feet in a microscope -– but they haven’t yet met me. 
Similarly, a forensic chemist might learn all sorts of useful bits of knowledge for 
art history by studying the chemical composition of the canvas of Irises –- but if 
they haven’t looked at the painting from the front, then they haven’t encountered 
the work which is Irises. And something has gone wrong in art history, if no art 
historian has ever encountered the artwork itself. Similarly, game scholars might 
learn all sorts of useful things about a game without playing it in the prescribed 
way, but they haven’t actually encountered the work itself. As game scholars, 
they may sometimes free themselves from the ludic imperative for some of their 
investigations. But if the organizing goal of those investigations is the game, then 
they also need to sometimes just follow the rules and actually play the damn 
thing.  
What’s more, these prescriptions do not force themselves into any encounter 
with the materiality of the work. Prescriptive ontologies leave room for other 
sorts of encounters with the materiality of a game. Take, for example, the practice 
of speedrunning -- a newly evolving gaming practice where players attempt to 
get from the start screen to the end screen of a level or game in as little time as 
possible. Some styles of speedrunning involve taking advantage of glitches in the 
game and unintentional consequences of various programmed phenomena. 
Speedrunning is an emergent practice, which often ignores some central game 
elements, and uses other game elements to purposes obviously unintended by 
their designer (Scully-Blaker 2014). Again, nothing about prescriptive ontology 
says that speedrunning Super Mario World is problematic or that a player must 
engage with the software as it was created to be played, rather than speedrunning 
it. It only says that speedrunning is an alternate mode of encounter with the ma-
terial substrate of a game, and not an encounter with the work that is Super Mario 
World. Speedrunning the software of Super Mario World is simply a different game 
from the original Super Mario World. The prescriptions of speedrunning create a 
different work from the same materials, just as Duchamp created a new work 
when he displayed a urinal in a museum, thus applying the prescriptions for mu-
seum sculpture to that physical bit of porcelain. In fact, it seems most plausible 
to say that speedrunners create a new and distinctive work, by appropriating 
software materials from an established work and merging them into a distinctive 
social practice with differing prescriptions. Accordingly, if one has reasons ema-
nating from elsewhere to play Super Mario World -– say a trusted friend told one 
that it was great -– one would not fulfill those reasons by speedrunning it. And if 
one were to have reasons to speedrun it, one would not fulfill them by playing by 
the original rules.  
To sum up: the prescriptions that arise around works are wholly conditional. 
Nothing says that you need to follow the rules of Cole Wehrle’s boardgame Root: 
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A Game of Woodland Might and Right (Wehrle 2018), full stop. You are free to move 
the pieces about as you wish, for any reason you wish. The prescriptions only say 
that if you want to experience the particular work that is Root, then you should 
follow the rules. The next question, then, is why we should care about encoun-
tering the work, rather than simply doing as we please with its material sub-
strate? One answer to that question will emerge from a comparison between the 
goals of free play and of structured communications.  
 
 
3. Play and Aesthetic Communication 
Consider the criticism that structured, rule-bound games run counter to the 
chaotic and anti-authoritarian nature of play. Play, says Sicart, is essentially free 
and appropriative; it takes practical objects out of their usual context and trans-
forms their use. Structured games resist this sort of re-appropriation, and so 
block true play. Sicart’s claim is even stronger than Leino’s. Sicart is not only 
arguing that it is permissible to ignore the prescriptions of game rules and goals 
-- he is arguing that we are better off when we ignore them.  
Sicart’s argument depends on two steps: first, that games are created for play 
-- or, as Sicart puts it, “games are just a formal manifestation of play (Sicart 2014, 
85). Second, that play is, by its nature, essentially unstructured. Play, says Sicart, 
is carnivalesque and appropriative. “…Play appropriates events, structures, and 
institutions to mock them and trivialize them” (3). Play is disruptive -- it takes 
over its context and disrupts the normal state of affairs. Thus, there is a tension 
between designed games and this idea of play. The game designer, says Sicart, is 
lauded and respecting for harnessing, controlling and steering play towards their 
intended purposes. But this runs counter to play’s essential nature. Games which 
attempt to control the player are doing so under a problematic model, says Sicart, 
treating the game designer as a kind of artist, who embeds meaning in a game’s 
system. The very modern notion of a game designer implies authorship, privi-
leged communication and authority, and this is troublesome. Instead, says Sicart, 
makers of games should provide nothing more than context, a focus for inspiring 
play (86-91).  
 
Designing for play means creating a setting rather than a system, a stage rather than 
a world, a model rather than a puzzle. Whatever is created has to be open, flexible, 
and malleable to allow players to appropriate, express, act and interact, make and 
become part of the form itself. (90) 
  
The argument here is representative of an attitude common throughout both the 
popular discussion of games and the academic scholarship. This attitude prefers 
toys to structured, rule-driven, goal-oriented games. It favors creative sandbox 
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games, such as Minecraft (Mojang 2011, which provide virtual environments, but 
leave the players free to decide their own goals.  
 I do not wish to argue against the importance of freeform play, or to contest 
the usefulness of games like Minecraft for promoting freeform play. Freeform play 
is certainly a valuable and essential part of human life. I only wish to resist the 
claim that freeform play is the only legitimate purpose of games.3 Another pur-
pose, I claim, is communication. Gary Iseminger’s discussion of aesthetic com-
munication will be quite useful here. Iseminger starts by considering the nature 
of aesthetic appreciation. Aesthetic appreciation, for Ismeninger, can be of many 
things, including natural objects, like sunsets, and unintentionally aesthetic arti-
facts, like ruins. But sometimes we make artifacts for the sake for the sake of 
others’ aesthetic appreciation. When we do so, we are engaged in a very partic-
ular act, which Ismeninger calls aesthetic communication. In aesthetic commu-
nication, one person formulates a plan to intentionally bring about a state of af-
fairs, with the aim and effect that somebody else finds experiencing that state of 
affairs to be valuable in itself (Iseminger 2004, 31-61).4 Notice that aesthetic com-
munication does not require the transmission of representational or conceptual 
content; it only requires aiming to bring about some sort of experience. Making 
sushi counts as aesthetic communication.  
 Aesthetic communication thus encompasses a significantly broader set of 
games than does, say, Ian Bogost’s treatment of games as a kind of argumentative 
rhetoric (Bogost 2010). Surely, as Bogost suggests, some games are a kind of 
rhetoric – they make arguments. Such games are one kind of communication. 
But many other games offer a different kind of communication: aesthetic com-
munications. Aesthetically communicative games attempt to bring about specific 
sorts of valuable experiences, to transmit them to others through an artifact. Spe-
cifically, in many cases, games are attempting to communicate aesthetically val-
uable experiences of activity: of doing, of skill, of decision and action. And the 
idea of communication can help us to understand why we might ever wish to 
follow the prescriptions associated with a work. Why we might we wish to take 
up all that ludic structure –- and play inside certain rules while following speci-
fied goals? Such structure and specificity are the means by which a game’s crea-
tors can sculpt and transmit specific types of experience. Again, we’re not talking 
about the artist fixing the meaning or interpretation of that experience. We’re 
talking about the artist fixing the basic structure of the experience itself –- the 
stable structure which is to be differently interpreted and investigated by differ-
ent users. The delicate awareness of inner life in The Remembrance of Things Past 
                                                        
3For	a	careful	dissection	of	the	line	between	artistic	games	which	seem	to	ask	us	to	play	them	as	games,	and	those	that	only	ask	for	a	more	freeform	exploration,	see	(Leino	2013). 4	Note	there	is	no	claim	here	the	artifacts	of	aesthetic	communication	always	thereby	count	as	art.	The	status	of	art	is,	for	Ismeninger	and	most	modern	aestheticists,	complexly	dependent	on	the	relationship	of	the	artwork	to	historical	institutions	of	art	practice.	
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depends on the particular ordering of the words; in order for there to be effective 
aesthetic communication, I must read the book in a particular order, and hold to 
certain norms of what words mean. A perfumer makes a perfume, concentrating 
entirely on how it smells, and ignoring how it tastes. They do so under the pre-
sumption that the audience will try to experience it by smelling it, and not drink-
ing it. In general, an artist creates a certain artifact, knowing that it will be expe-
rienced following certain prescriptions. They are designing a particular kind of 
experience, and they do so under the presumption that others will experience 
that artifact while following those prescriptions. The audience needs to follow 
those prescriptions to retrieve that experience.5  
 Similarly, the rules and goals of striving games are the means by which a 
game designer interested in aesthetic communication achieves experiential spec-
ificity -- the means by which they sculpt the particular experiences of practical 
action and practical reasoning for a player (Nguyen forthcoming). Notice how 
obedience to the rules of a game helps to create the experiential specificity of that 
particular game. For example: the restriction on speaking in partnership Bridge 
makes possible the particular practical experience of deduction, information 
management, and communication under adverse conditions. In a rock-climbing 
gym, a climber must climb under specific restrictions. To count as having suc-
cessfully climbed a route, a climber may use only the holds designated for that 
route and must reach the top without weighting the rope. Climbs are often set to 
force interestingly novel motions out of the climber, to tease the climber into dis-
covering some particular graceful movement. Novices will sometimes complain 
about the restrictiveness of all those rules and then proceed to swing about on 
the rope, using all the holds on the well. They are certainly playing in Sicart’s 
sense, and they are getting at one particular sort of valuable experience. But if 
they never climb according to the rules, then they will never experience the par-
ticular form difficult motion and action that has been sculpted by the route setter. 
They are failing to experience the work, as surely as somebody who attends a 
Turner exhibit blindfolded and tripping on acid fails to experience any Turner 
paintings. They may have had a different experience, entirely valuable in its own 
way, but they will have failed to get the particular form of value on offer from 
Turner paintings.  
 I am not denying the importance of free play; I merely arguing that free play 
and communication are different practices, each valuable in its own way. And 
there is a trade-off between these two activities. Most communication involves 
shared norms –- not just aesthetic communication, but linguistic communication 
and more. Communicating with language requires that we share a set of norms 
and prescriptions, in order to stabilize the ground between us. The more I reject 
any shared norms, the more freely I can play, but the less I can communicate and 
                                                        5	For	a	very	useful	survey	of	work	on	the	normativity	of	meaning,	see	(Glüer	and	Wikforss	2009)	
  13 
receive communications. The more I wish to communicate, the more I must bind 
myself, for the moment, to a set of shared norms. The promise of communication 
thus gives us reasons to sometimes abide by certain norms.  
 And, furthermore, the promise of communication gives us reasons to some-
times value participating in certain established practices with established norms. 
When a social practice becomes established, and when a type of prescriptive on-
tology becomes established -– when we know what to do with a painting, a novel, 
a performance art piece, or an arty videogame –- then artists and audiences can 
start to rely on each other. Artists can rely on audiences to know how to engage 
with a work, and to be skilled at that form of engagement. And audiences can 
develop those skills, knowing that more art will likely come along in that vein.  
  To speak loosely: different bodies of prescriptions help to create different 
languages. The prescriptions around painting help to create a visual language, 
the prescriptions around novels help to create a language of stories, and the pre-
scriptions around games help to create a language of activity. 
 
 
4. Aesthetic Prescriptions and Adequate Encounters with Games 
So far, I have argued for the existence of prescriptions in games. Games are 
works, which are partially constituted by prescriptions about our interaction. 
Those prescriptions carve off what the work is, ontologically speaking. Further-
more, I have provided at least one reason we should sometimes submit to these 
prescriptions. Prescriptive stability helps, among other things, ground the possi-
bility of communication. This is a feature which games share with other, more 
traditional works.  
But thinking in terms of prescriptive ontologies will also help us to see how 
distinctive games are from more traditional kinds of works. Games are interac-
tive, emergent, and socially embedded artifacts; thus, they give rise to substan-
tially different sorts of prescriptions than with other, traditional forms of art. I 
will spend the remainder of this paper exploring some of these distinctive pre-
scriptions. 
Let’s consider two sorts of requirements which might emerge from a prescrip-
tive ontology. The first requirement concerns what counts as a minimally adequate 
encounter -- for example, to have a minimally adequate encounter with a painting, 
we must visually encounter the painted surface. Minimally encountering a novel 
requires that we look at the words, in sequence. The second requirement con-
cerns what counts as having a deeper or fuller encounter with the work. For exam-
ple, the ontology of, say, 20th century painting prescribes that a deeper encounter 
involves looking more carefully at the details of the brushstroke, and perhaps 
reading the artist’s statement and learning some art history. Smelling the canvas, 
or weighing it, or eating it, doesn’t count. Different sorts of practices seem to 
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require, for their justification, different depths of encounter. To say that I saw 
Irises, or to register a casual aesthetic judgment, I may need only have had a min-
imally adequate encounter. But I ought not review Irises for the New York Times, 
say, until I have had a deeper encounter.6 
What might the prescriptions involve for games? Two sorts of prescriptions 
immediately come to mind: prescriptions to engage with the fiction -– to use the 
elements of the work to imagine a fictional world,7 and prescriptions that arise 
from ludic engagements with the game –- from trying to win by the rules. Jesper 
Juul suggests that videogames are half-fictional and half-real (Juul 2004), but I 
do not think that the relevant prescriptions always apply in equal measure. How 
do we ascertain which prescriptions apply? Let’s suppose, for the moment, that 
the game designers have made no overt declarations of their sanctions. Irvin sug-
gests, in those cases, that we deduce the relevant prescriptive practice from the 
context of placement -- novels occur in a bookstore, and paintings in a museum. 
But I do not think contextual clues are always sufficient. Most computer games 
are purchased in the same sorts of places -- Steam, iTunes, Amazon. Most board 
games are purchased from great disorganized piles in hobbyist game stores or 
from haphazardly organized online sites. But this situation is far from unique. If 
I peruse a friend’s bookshelf, I might encounter encyclopedias, tour books, po-
etry collections, and novels all mixed together. Note how different the prescrip-
tions are in those cases. If we wanted to read a novel, reading the numbered sub-
sections in random order wouldn’t count. But, for a short-story collection, read-
ing the numbered sub-section in random order would count. In these cases, we 
classify works into a prescriptive practice by examining prominent features of 
the work itself and searching for a best explanation those prominent features. 
Even if I knew nothing else about it, I could tell that Jane Austen’s Persuasion 
has the prescriptive ontology of novels, because it has features -- a continuous 
plot and recurring characters -- that are best explained by fitting into the social 
practice of novels. When lacking contextual clues, we can look to prominent basic 
features of the work that identify it as being part of one practice or another, which 
can then point the way to the prescriptions associated with those practices.  
Let me briefly touch on the prescriptions related to games’ aspects as fiction. 
Certain elements of some games are best explained in terms of their participation 
in the social practice of fiction. For example, consider the kinds of characters we 
might encounter in a videogame. As Espen Aarseth points out, some games offer 
us shallow bots, where other games offer us rich, round, full characters (Aarseth 
2012, 130-1). The best explanation of a game with rich, round, characters is that 
                                                        6	Brock	Rough	aided	this	paper	enormously	by	pressing	for	the	distinction	between	adequate	and	deeper	en-counters.	7	Grant	Tavinor	offers	us	a	careful	account	of	the	prescriptions	involved	in	engaging	with	a	videogame	as	fic-tion,	developed	from	Kendall	Walton’s	account	of	fiction	as	make-believe	(Tavinor	2009,	Walton	1990).		
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it partakes in the social practice of fiction, and that we are prescribed to imagine 
a fictional world and those fictional characters within it.  
What might the ludic prescriptions be for games? Surely, at the very least, 
we are to play by the rules and aim at the specified goal. But I think that isn’t all. 
Since games are emergent and strategic, there will also sometimes be prescrip-
tions involving the number of playings and skill level required for encountering a 
game. I will argue that, for some games, multiple playings and moderate skill are 
a pre-requisite for an adequate encounter with the game, and that, for some 
games, a deeper encounter involves a very large number of playings and a devel-
oping a high degree of skill. One practical outcome of this view is that, while it 
may be permissible to judge a film after a single viewing, for certain types of 
games, reviewing or otherwise offering a summary judgment of the merits of a 
game after a single play is as improper as, say, reviewing a book after reading 
only the first chapter.8   
There are threads of this thought sprinkled in recent works on games and 
related objects. Take Gonzolo Frasca’s suggestions that games are representa-
tions of causal networks; a game, says Frasca, can say something about the world 
-- about politics, or economics -- in the way that a static work cannot, precisely 
because it can model different outcomes to different decisions over different play-
ings (Frasca 2003). Dominic Lopes has defended a similar view in his analysis of 
interactive computer art. In interactive computer art, he says, the work is the 
algorithm -- the possibility space. A single interaction with the work isn’t suffi-
cient to explore the possibility space; in fact, interactive computer art prescribes 
multiple encounters, in order to apprehend the possibility space (Lopes 2010, 27-
36,60). Similarly, Tavinor suggests that some videogames may have interactive 
narratives such that multiple playings are required to explore the possibility 
space (Tavinor 2017, 27). 
But surely not all computer games prescribe multiple play-throughs. Take, 
for example, puzzle games, like The Room (Fireproof Games 2012). Puzzles have 
single solutions; for a game consisting entirely of puzzles, further play-throughs 
yield no further features.9 Perhaps, then, we should follow Jesper Juul’s 
                                                        8	It	is	surely	permissible	to	offer	an	explicitly	partial	judgment.	“I’ve	only	read	the	first	two	chapters,	but	so	far…”	“I’ve	only	played	the	introduction,	but	so	far…”	It	is	summary	judgments,	which	present	themselves	as	being	of	the	whole	work,	that	must	be	responsive	to	the	prescriptions	for	encountering	the	whole	work.	Note	that	the	fol-lowing	arguments,	combined	with	my	discussion	of	the	ludic	imperative,	function	as	a	defense	of	Aarseth’s	claim	that	game	skill	is	required	for	game	scholars,	against	Leino’s	criticisms	(Aarseth	2003).	9	An	anonymous	reviewer	has	suggested	that	these	remarks	are	problematized	by	Veli-Matti	Karhulahti’s	claim	that	puzzles	are	not	games,	because	games,	by	definition,	evaluate	the	player,	and	puzzles	do	not	(Karhulahti	2015,	25).	I	do	not	take	this	to	be	troubling,	because	I	don’t	accept	that	account	of	games,	as	I	argue	elsewhere.	Briefly,	I	take	the	need	for	evaluation	to	be	a	local	and	contingent	cultural	phenomenon,	related	to	a	recent	rise	in	the	culture	of	quantification.	In	fact,	in	many	cases,	there	is	coherent	ludic	activity	which	only	gains	quantitative	and	evaluative	features	when	they	evolve	into	formalized	competition.	Consider,	for	example,	skateboarders	informally	competing	for	most	stylish	trick.	Such	ludic	activity	is	coherent	as	such,	without	any	built-in	system	of	evaluation;	such	skate-boarders,	in	fact,	can	compete	without	deciding	in	the	end	who	won.	It	is	only	when	those	practices	are	formalized	in	a	professional	context	that	we	find	the	imposition	of	regimes	of	quantified	evaluation,	such	as	in	professional	
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suggestion and separate the space of games into games of emergence and games 
of progression. Games of emergence have simple rules that lead to complex play; 
where games of progression may have vast sets of rules but have simple solutions. 
Chess is a game of emergence -- it has rules that fit on one sheet of paper, but 
vast libraries of strategy books. Many traditional puzzle-based computer adven-
ture games are games of progression. They may vastly complicated rules (in the 
form of computer code), but the solution can be written on a single sheet of paper 
-- what’s called a walkthrough (Juul 2004, 67-82). 
I think this is right. Furthermore, it seems most likely that there are a great 
many different gaming social practices, each of which grounds a different pre-
scriptive ontologies, just as there are different traditional art world social prac-
tices which ground different artistic prescriptive ontologies. The practice of puz-
zles -- crosswords, acrostics, and logic puzzles -- is one where an adequate en-
counter requires only solving the puzzle once. But the practice of high-skill board 
and card games is a tradition where having an adequate encounter may first  de-
mand a lengthy process of skill-development. There is an old saying around Go 
players: “First thing you do, lose a hundred games as quickly as possible. Then 
you are ready to begin studying the game.” So let’s explore some of the possible 
variety of game-types, in terms of their prescriptive ontologies.10  
 
 
5. Party Games, Strategy Games, and the Number of Playings 
So, what are these differing practices with games? I will not pretend to offer 
any exhaustive list. As an opening exploration, I will identify three distinct types, 
which cross both physical gaming and computer gaming. Two are older prac-
tices, one is new. They all occur within Juul’s category of emergent games: none 
of them have single solutions, or are based around puzzles. But I will argue each 
sub-type is embedded in a practice which calls for a different prescriptive ontol-
ogy, with differing prescriptions for what counts as a minimally adequate en-
counter. Let’s call them party games, heavy strategy games, and community evolution 
games.  
First, consider two party games: the supposedly funny tabletop game Cards 
Against Humanity (Dillon et al 2011), and the video game B.U.T.T.O.N 
                                                        tournament	skateboarding.	Furthermore,	we	could	easily	take	even	videogame	artifacts,	and	imagine	lusory	engage-ment	with	them	without	substantive	evaluation.	For	example,	imagine	Super	Mario	World	without	points	--	there	is	a	goal,	rules,	and	ludic	engagement,	but	no	quantified	scoring.	At	least,	there	is	only	a	single	success/failure	condi-tion	--	which	we	also	find	with	puzzles.	For	a	more	in-depth	version	of	this	discussion,	see	(Nguyen	forthcoming,	Chapter	9).		10	Please	note	that	I	am	talking	here	about	categories	of	prescriptive	ontologies	--	what	have	been	called	work-types	--	which	is	distinct	from	the	question	of	game	genres.	One	genre	can	exist	across	many	work-types	--	the	fan-tasy	genre,	for	example,	exists	across	board	games,	computer	games,	traditional	novels,	cinema,	and	interactive	ad-venture	books.		The	notion	of	a	work-type	here	is	also	different	from	classifications	based	on	game	mechanics,	such	as	the	one	offered	by	Aki	Jarvinen	(Järvinen	2003).	As	should	be	evident	later,	any	of	Jarvinen’s	mechanical	catego-ries	--	trading,	bidding,	allocating	--	can	occur	in	any	of	the	work-types	I	suggest.	
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(Copenhagen Games Collective 2010). In Cards Against Humanity, players answer 
questions or finish incomplete phrases by selecting from their hand of cards, each 
with some intentionally absurd, ridiculous, or supposedly offensive phrase. For 
example: to the prompt, “If you detect it early, you can stop ____” different play-
ers might respond with cards such as: “A sneezing fetish,” “Old people smell,” 
“Vigorous jazz hands,” or “Totally fuckable aliens.”11 B.U.T.T.O.N. (a.k.a. Brutally 
Unfair Tactics Totally OK Now) is a multiplayer XBOX 360 game, in which players 
are surprised with any variety of mini-games. For example: the game will first 
order all players to put their controllers down and take five paces back. After a 
brief countdown, the game will suddenly provide a new mini-game: like telling 
the players that when the X button on their controller is pressed, they will lose. 
Sprinting, wrestling, and occasional fisticuffs typically follow.  
Suppose, for the moment, that one has simply been handed copies of Cards 
Against Humanity and B.U.T.T.O.N. without any contextual information. In both 
cases, obvious features in the games classify them within an established practice. 
Party games, I propose, are a practice in which the long-term development of 
skill is unimportant or actively discouraged. (Imagine if you found out that I 
scoured forums for Charades tips and strategies, studied Youtube videos to watch 
effective Charades players, and practiced their techniques with my siblings to be 
sure that I won at the next Charades event.) In fact, in both games, the system by 
which a victor is selected is obviously and patently arbitrary. In Cards Against 
Humanity, one player each round is the judge, and selects which card strikes them 
as funniest. As for B.U.T.T.O.N.: here’s the co-designer, describing the inspiration 
he took from an earlier party game, WarioWare: Smooth Moves (Intelligent System 
2006). 
 
Smooth Moves features a collection of zany “micro-games” that only last a couple of 
seconds. In each micro-game, one player uses their wiimote to adopt a silly pose, 
such as “The Elephant” or “The Samurai.” From that pose, the player attempts to 
complete a simple little task, such as tracing a shape or slicing a virtual piece of wood. 
None of these micro-games would work very well individually. Rather, they work 
together in series, synergistically. Because Smooth Moves fires off these micro-games 
at such a manic pace, it is difficult to get too emotionally invested in any one 
                                                        11	Actual	examples	from	the	game.		 		 	
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challenge. The focus is shifted away from the game-delineated reward system of win-
ning and losing, towards the human beings performing and willfully making fools of 
themselves. (Wilson 2011) 
 
Notice the lack of any discussion of elements of skill development, decision 
trees, or possibility spaces. There is no reason to think that party games have, as 
part of their ontology, a prescription for repeat encounters. Their designs, in fact, 
foreground arbitrariness, skill-lessness, and intentional chaos. I suspect that the 
social practice of party games, in fact, requires that they be played with a spirit 
of levity. Somebody who has played a silly party game like B.U.T.T.O.N. in a spirit 
of deadly earnest competition has, I suspect, not yet earned the right to issue any 
kind of conclusive judgement of the game.  
Compare these sorts of games with heavy strategy games. First, consider the 
board game, 1830: Railways & Robber Barons (Tresham 1986), created by Francis 
Tresham (who also designed the board game Civilization (Tresham 1980), and in 
so doing introduced the idea of technology trees into board gaming and video 
gaming (Woods 2012, 40)). 1830 is an extraordinarily complex game -- it is almost 
two separate games merged into one. Half of the game is stock manipulation: 
players buy and trade stock in train companies, manipulating stock market prices 
through their actions. The other half of the game involves managing those com-
panies: laying track, designing efficient routes, improving one’s train technology. 
Much of the complexity of the game evolves from the relationship between these 
two halves, as the stock valuations of the companies change and shift with the 
companies’ operations. A player can build a train company with a hidden flaw, 
trick others into investing into it, and then loot the company and dump it on their 
minority shareholders. But 1830 is full of features which make no sense on a sin-
gle playing. First, there are features that don’t make sense until players are high-
skill enough to use them, and the development of that skill takes many playings. 
For example, there is a rule that, when a stock price declines sufficiently, that 
stock becomes a junk stock and can be traded in greater volume. This rule only 
makes sense as part of the game when players understand stock market manipu-
lation enough to intentionally bring about and take advantage of a junk rating. 
Second, there are early decisions in the game that simply cannot be made intelli-
gently on a first playing. For example, when a player starts a company, she must 
set its “par value” -- its price-per-stock. Players set par values on many of their 
companies in the first round, but the implications of that decision will not be 
apparent until players fully understand how the various sub-systems of the game 
interact -- which cannot happen until at least the second playing, and probably 
many more.  
Second, consider the computer game Dream Quest (Whalen 2014), part of a 
family of games called “rogue-likes.” The key features of rogue-likes are that each 
playing involves a new procedurally generated dungeon to explore; and that 
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death is permanent. Dream Quest adds to this a deck-building element: one fights 
monsters using a deck, and one builds that deck piece by piece, picking up new 
cards one at a time as one explores the dungeon. Many of the early card-powers 
have synergies and possibilities that can only be understood after having seen 
how they interact with later-stage card powers. These are core features of the 
game, but they are invisible or incomprehensible in early playings. In heavy strat-
egy games, core features of the work only become visible and coherent after repeat play-
ings.  
The social practice of heavy strategy games is very different from that of party 
games. Players of a heavy strategy game may study the game, devise new strate-
gies, discuss strategies with others, and slowly master the game over many play-
ings. Games like 1830 and Dream Quest have design features which make sense 
only within that elongated context. So: first, there are publicly accessible features 
in 1830 and Dream Quest which indicate the artist’s sanction, by indicating a gam-
ing social practice into which the game has been sanctioned. Second: the heavy 
strategy game sub-type is a practice which prescribes multiple playings. There 
are features of the work which only come into view after multiple encounters. 
These features, though unobvious to the new player, are, in fact, central. And we 
can tell they are central because that centrality is the best explanation for clear 
design elements of the game. So players need to develop enough skill to bring 
those central features into view, in order to adequately encounter the work. Thus, 
for a work of heavy strategy, a player must play multiple times and develop suf-
ficient skill in order to adequately encounter the work. 
Think about what players engaged deeply with games like 1830 and Dream 
Quest are doing. Their attention is on emergent features, which require significant 
skill to see. One might reasonably object here that this is a feature common to 
many other artistic practices. Charlotte Bronte’s novel Jane Eyre and Hierony-
mous Bosch’s painting The Garden of Earthly Delights are full of subtle details that 
reveal themselves on repeat viewings. But let’s distinguish here, again, between 
a deep encounter and a minimally adequate encounter. Though many readings of 
Jane Eyre may reveal many nuances, and foster a profound and subtle under-
standing, a single reading suffices for a minimally adequate encounter. Not so, 
for Chess, Go, Bridge, 1830, and Dream Quest. The difference is that central fea-
tures of Jane Eyre are visible to the competent reader on a single reading, but 
central features of Chess are not visible on a single playing. Consider: if we asked 
somebody who had read Jane Eyre for the first time, and somebody who had read 
it for the thousandth, what the most important features of the work were, what 
the central narrative elements were, they would largely agree -- it would be Jane 
Eyre, her poverty and helplessness, her relationship with Rochester, and Roch-
ester’s mad wife. But if one were to ask the same questions of an experienced Go 
player -- if one were to ask what the central features were, to which they were 
  20 
attending -- one would receive entirely different answers than from a novice. An 
experienced Go player attends constantly to features like influence -- that is, the 
way a piece or structure on one side of the board radiates potential power in 
complex ways towards other areas of the board. To even begin thinking about 
influence, a Go player needs to have internalized enough of the basic mechanics 
of the game to be able to read certain basic sequences effortlessly (Kageyama 
2007, 55-64,87-109). And then their basic experience of the game is transformed. 
Simon Dor calls this kind of transformative effect strategic perception. Experi-
enced players of both Chess and Starcraft: Brood Wars (Blizzard Entertainment 
1998) have different perceptual experiences of objects in the game. An experi-
enced Chess player, for examples, looks at a rook and sees, not a particularly 
figured piece, but lines of movement and potential. In fact, says Dor, visual game 
design decisions can help enable that transformation of perception. The shape of 
Chess pieces is simple and consistent across most non-novelty sets, and Starcraft 
repeats visually identical tiles. This all aids the transformation of perception (Dor 
2014). For many games, key elements of the game only come into view through 
training and experience. When those skill-dependent elements are central to the 
work, then the work can only be adequately experienced by a skilled player. This 
is, in some sense, a familiar point. Many other sorts of works require significant 
backgrounds skill to access. Written works require a complex background skill 
of language; I may pass my eyes over the characters in a Chinese poem, but since 
I don’t read or speak Chinese, I have no access to the work. With literary works, 
however, one language skill grants access to many different works. We might say 
that, with heavy strategy games, each game has its own distinct skill and learning 
process, by which one learns to see perceive its elements. One has to, so to speak, 
learn the language of each game anew.ix 
Heavy strategy games then, prescribe not only following the rules and pur-
suing the designated goal, but also prescribe multiple playings and the develop-
ment of sufficient skill to interact with the core features of the game, where those 
core features are often emergent strategic phenomena. You have to play a game 
a lot and gain enough skill with the game in order to actually encounter the work, 
and to ground any sort of legitimate judgment of the work. There’s a normative 
sting here. Consider a sort of figure that has become quite popular nowadays: the 
online reviewer of strategic boardgames. Many of the most influential reviewers 
in the boardgame world have achieved popularity and cultural influence by 
providing a regular stream of reviews; they end up reviewing an enormous num-
ber of games. In many cases, in order to pull this off, they play each game a bare 
handful of times –- sometimes even only once. If this account is right, then for 
heavy strategy games, such reviewers have never actually encountered the games 
that they are reviewing. And it is easy to see how damaging it might be to the 
social practice of heavy strategy games, if its most influential critics are issuing 
  21 
largely illegitimate judgments, based on inadequate encounters, in which they 
have not yet brought basic features of the work into view.  
 
 
6. Community Evolution Games 
This leads us to another class of prescriptions: that, to encounter certain types 
of games properly, one must encounter them in groups. This is, in part, blindingly 
obvious. The prescriptions of many games are such that they can only be ade-
quately encountered by acting with groups of people. Perhaps, with a game like 
Chess, a single person might be able to play both sides of an encounter by them-
selves. But any game which involves hidden information -- cards, or pieces with 
concealed information like Stratego -- cannot be adequately experienced by a sin-
gle person. This is also true of embodied team sports and simultaneous-action 
multiplayer game, such as multiplayer shooters. For many multiplayer games, the 
prescriptions of minimal encounters can only be met by an individual acting with 
a group. Call this the multiplayer requirement. 
But there is a type of game which is even more deeply socially embedded, and 
which gives rise to prescriptive requirements significantly more complicated than 
the multiplayer requirement. Let’s consider the category of community evolution 
games. Key examples in this genre include Magic: The Gathering (Garfield 2013), 
Android: Netrunner (Garfield and Litzsinger 2012), and Hearthstone (Blizzard 
2014). This is a relatively new practice in gaming. I will discuss Android: Netrunner, 
since it is the one I know best, but all the comments I make below are applicable 
to the whole class. Android: Netrunner is a customizable card-game. A player de-
signs their deck before play from a large pool of possible cards. Decks usually 
are designed around some particular strategy, with the various card powers in-
tended to interact in some way. Some decks are fast and aggressive; others build 
slowly. Some work by brute force; others depend on deceit and misdirection. The 
possibility of different deck types gives rise to an emergent, complicated form of 
second-guessing, like rock-paper-scissors with a PhD. Serious players become 
deeply involved in what’s called “the meta”, or “metagaming” -- what Marcus 
Carter et al. describe as “a complex interplay between the game community and 
the game itself” (Carter, Gibbs and Harrop 2012, 2-3). Serious play of these 
games involves engagement with a constant flow of information and strategic 
analysis through the community of players, usually via Internet sites and forums. 
Certain types of decks become known as particularly effective or powerful and 
thus become popular. Players must design their own deck to cope with the vari-
ous deck-types they might encounter. The strategic space evolves as players re-
spond to the deck-types currently in play, and then respond to those responses, 
and so on (Johansson 2009, 5-7). What’s more, the pool of available cards con-
stantly changes. Fantasy Flight Games releases a new set of cards every month, 
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resulting in an ever-changing changing, unstable meta. Most serious Netrunner 
players will tell you that the constant flux of the meta is the point; that the most 
interesting part of the game is when the new cards get released, and all the play-
ers scramble to figure out how they change play (Smith 2015; Majewski 2014). 
And, in fact, the designers of Netrunner are constantly monitoring the meta, and 
creating new cards in response to the current state of the meta: to tweak it, to 
break emerging strategies that seem to dominant, and to keep things interesting 
(Browne 2017). For example, when the meta starts to get stale and devolve into 
a predictable set of deck designs, designers will usually introduce a new mechanic 
specifically to encourage a greater diversity of decks (Ventre 2016). There has 
been some debate about whether the metagame is part of the game, or external 
to the game (Carter, Gibbs and Harrop 2012, 2,4). This analysis offers a clear 
answer: insofar as major features of the game design are publicly declared as 
attempts to alter the endgame for the purposes of better play, and the best expla-
nation for those features is that effect on the community’s strategic discourse, 
then the metagame is surely part of the work.  
For an ontologist interested in works, Magic, Netrunner, Hearthstone and their 
customizable kin should now seem rather fascinating. What might their prescrip-
tive ontologies be? Given the actuality of the practice, and given evident design 
features of the game, the prescriptions demand not only multiple playings, but to 
demand participation in the larger community of players for an adequate encounter 
with the work. Many central features of Netrunner can only be explained in virtue 
of their interaction with the community of players and the evolving meta. Most 
obviously, the constantly changing card pool -- especially the way older cards 
drop out -- only makes sense as an attempt to keep the meta interesting. And 
since this central feature of the game only makes sense in relationship to the meta, 
then being in contact with the meta -- reading the forums, thinking about the 
currently popular decks, responding to them -- is requisite for an adequate en-
counter with the game. Two players who purchase the game and play it at home 
may have a very nice experience, but they have not had an adequate encounter 
with the full game, just as I have not yet had a minimally adequate encounter 
with Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past, even though I have thoroughly enjoyed 
the first eighth of it that have read. Core features of the game are incomprehen-
sible, invisible, or inactive without active participation in a gaming community.   
T. L. Taylor has argued that using information from outside play-sessions -- 
from online forums -- is legitimate gaming practice, and so argued against the 
idea of any impermeable membrane separating sessions of game-play from outer 
life (Taylor 2009, 2007). My argument goes one step further: I claim that, for 
these sorts of games, using information from outside the game, from resources 
such as online forums, is ontologically prescribed by the game, and so a necessary 
precondition for having an adequate encounter with the game. Call this the 
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community embedding requirement, which is significantly stronger than the multi-
player requirement. The multiplayer requirement can be met merely by playing 
a game once with a group of people. The community embedding requirement 
requires multiple plays within the same community and responding to newly de-
veloping strategies within that community. 
If this is right, then community evolution games are ontologically very dis-
tinctive from other sorts of works. I can appreciate other types of works in com-
munities, but communal experience isn’t required for a minimally adequate ex-
perience. It is probably more enjoyable to watch The Big Lebowski in a crowd, but 
I can still make a legitimate aesthetic judgment from having watched it only by 
myself. Discussing the movie with a group may deepen my experience, but I can 
still encounter the central features of the work on my own. But community evo-
lution games are different. I cannot have an adequate experience of them unless 
I am embedded in a larger community, and taking part in the community’s evolv-
ing and emergent metagame.  
I doubt that these sorts of games are alone in having some sort of community 
embedding requirement. We might plausibly expect to find a similar sort of re-
quirement with, say, street art. Nick Riggle argues that street art is essentially 
public, and depends partially for its artistic merit on its interaction with public 
spaces and community responses (Riggle 2010). Similarly, one might think that 
the aesthetic appreciation of urban design requires that the appreciator be part 
of a community actually living within that design. What unifies all of these types 
of art is that they are socially embedded, essentially communal works. And it 
should be no surprise that the traditional art world -- which has largely focused 
on the sorts of practices aimed at individual and private encounters -- has often 
been unwilling to recognize the merits of such radically social and communal 
works. Such communal works are a poor fit with traditional aesthetic theory, but 
the fault here lies in the problematically individualist presumptions of traditional 
aesthetic theory. The theory of art has been historically aimed at understanding 
the sorts of artistic experience that could be had solitary individuals. But some 
of the most interesting game designs are that can only be adequately encountered 
by individuals embedded in groups and communities of game play.  
 
 
7. Negotiating Social Practices 
 Let’s take a step back from the details. Thinking about prescriptive ontol-
ogies can shed some light on the social reception of games, and our attempts to 
negotiate how we are supposed to engage with and respond to them. Consider, 
for example, John Sharp’s discussion of the aesthetics of games. Sharp distin-
guishes between games, artgames, and game art. According to sharp, games are 
things like Super Mario World. They are meant to entertain us by being played. 
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Artgames are things like Braid (Blow 2008), which also need to be played, but aim 
to providing some deeper value than mere entertainment. And game art is things 
like Cory Arcangel’s Super Mario Clouds (2002), which is an installation artwork 
for display in a museum, which redeploys graphics from Super Mario Brothers 3 
(Miyamoto 1988), while removing all the game elements. Super Mario Clouds is 
not really meant to be played in the familiar sense; it is intended for exhibition in 
a traditional museum context.  
 But why should we care about which is which? Are we just fussing about 
labels? The story of prescriptive ontology gives us a clear view of what’s at stake. 
What we are actually doing, when we make these classifications, is placing games 
in a social practice, with associated norms. Artgames are embedded in the social 
practice of gaming and inherit many of their prescriptions from that gaming prac-
tice. Game art is embedded in a social practice rooted in the museum art practice 
–- paintings, sculptures, installations, and interactive installations –- and inherits 
many of those prescriptions. When we are fussing about classifications, we are 
actually fussing about what the right prescriptions for interaction are, for each 
work. 
 The larger point here is not to impose taxonomic distinctions or to fix 
eternal boundaries from on high. The point is to recast certain of the taxonomic 
struggles we’ve seen in a social and practical light. Because, crucially, we are in 
charge of our social practices, and so in charge of the prescriptions underlying 
our works. They are not set in stone. And we are perpetually in the process of 
re-shaping those social practices to best fit new technologies and new innovations 
in game design and artistic practice. Elizabeth Cantalamessa suggests that we 
should view all those endless debates over what is or is not really art as a kind of 
collective practical exercise in conceptual engineering. There aren’t any inde-
pendent facts of the matter about what art really is, or what game art really is. 
Rather, when we’re arguing about what is or is not art, we’re actually negotiating 
about what the best way to cut up the conceptual space, and how we should 
change our concepts going forward. When we’re arguing about whether perfor-
mance art is really art, what we’re doing is deciding whether or not they should be 
treated in a similar way to other arts –- whether they should be funded, taught, 
displayed, and reviewed alongside the other arts (Cantalamessa 2018).  
 Something similar is going on, I suggest, when we try to taxonomize these 
new gaming phenomena –- when we try to locate various artifacts in the catego-
ries of games, artgames, and game art. What we’re doing is trying out those arti-
facts within different prescriptive regimes and seeing how it goes. We are, in a 
sense, taking some material and it them through the paces of different possible 
prescriptive ontologies -– and, in doing so, generating a variety of works, to see 
what works for us. This taxonomic struggle, and the cultural struggle behind it, 
is exactly the kind of thing we should expect to see whenever an art culture 
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encounters new media, new techniques, and new technologies. First, we attempt 
to shove artifacts into the various social practices and prescriptive regimes that 
we already have, to see how they do. We are trying out treat games as conceptual 
art, or installation art, or performance art, since these are prescriptive regimes 
that are ready to hand. But I expect we should see, as we come to terms with the 
special technologies and techniques of games, that new social practices will arise, 
merging, synthesizing, and evolving from our older practices, with their own dis-
tinctive sets of prescriptions and ontologies.  
 So, in the end, is there a right way to play a game? The answer is compli-
cated. Literally and narrowly, yes: a particular game is a work, and there is a 
right way to play it. Playing it that way retrieves the particular sorts of experi-
ences that the artist intended to embed in the material artifact. Obeying the pre-
scription is the only way to experience the original work – and so the only way 
to actually experience that work as a communication. In a larger sense, however, 
we are not always bound to experience particular bits of material under the re-
gime of the artist’s intent. We also have reason to experiment, to re-mix and re-
shuffle, to try out various artifacts under various different prescriptive regimes, 
and so generate new works. In that way, we can explore the space of possible 
social practices, to generate new patterns of prescriptions, and to figure out 
which ones we should focus on. And creating new practices will, in turn, create 
new possibilities for new types of works and new forms of communication –- 
which we can receive only by playing the game the right way.  
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